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STATE ACTUARIAL PROBLEMS IN
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
W. R. WiLmkMSoN*
Under the Social Security Act considerable responsibility is placed upon the
individual states to formulate their own provisions for specific benefits and rates of
contribution in unemployment compensation. To aid them in this responsibility,
there seems to be available a very scanty fund of statistical information directly appli-
cable to the situation in the individual state.
The determination of the relationship between contributions and benefits in any
new insurance line is necessarily and fundamentally dependent upon guesswork.
Unemployment compensation involves the setting aside from income as earned of a
given rate of contribution so that when certain types of unemployment arise com-
pensation at some given rate may be paid for some specified period of time. Since
the federal tax rate has been determined after a brief two year preliminary period at
3% of the total payroll of those employers with 8 or more employees in 2o different
weeks, and since all but ioo of the tax is to be credited to the employers in those
states which have approved plans in operation, and all of the contribution to the state
must go into benefits, it is implied that the provision for benefits is at least 2.7% of
payroll, more if the employees contribute in addition. The recommended benefit
scale which has been adopted in most of the states provides a benefit of half-pay,
with a maximum of $15 a week. The basis of most investigations is aimed at the
determination of a reasonable duration of benefits or, should specified duration also
be determined, how much more than the minimum ought to be contributed to make
it probable that the unemployment compensation plan will remain solvent.
The Committee on Economic Security has indicated, for the guidance of the
states, a tentative estimate of the maximum duration of benefits indicated as tenable
by their nation-wide surveys:
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TABLE I
Crude Estimates After Actuarial Adjustment of Maximum Duration of Benefits of
Half-Pay with a Weekly Maximum of $15 Based Upon:
3% Contribution 4% Contribution 5% Contribution
Waiting Period 2.7% for Benefits 3.6% for Benefits 4.5% for Benefits
2 weeks io weeks 15 weeks 21 weeks
3 II 17 24
4 12 4i8 " 26 c
The British experience with unemployment insurance, part of the coverage having
been in force since 1911, has convinced the British students of the subject that even
after many years of actual experience no clear certainty as to the progress of claim
rates is yet possible. The great depression seems to show that if it is possible to do so,
there must be accumulated from the good years provision to be available in the bad.
It seems possible, also, that the forces which determine the adoption of social in-
surance indicate a recognition of changing attitudes towards employment and relief
which will themselves react upon employment conditions. This does not necessarily
indicate that the changed rates of unemployment result from the adoption of social
insurance but that social insurance is adopted in a period of social development where
the clearest indications are that recent history will not promptly repeat itself.
Other papers in this series outline the scope of the coverage expected under the
Social Security Act and include an analysis of factors affecting our limiting benefits.1
Where such factors drastically affect cost estimates, there will be some further dis-
cussion here.
Many of the most important factors affecting cost will be omitted in the following
discussion. There is no attempt to estimate the varying rates of probable unemploy-
ment by wage categories, though herein lies a credit item since, presumably, unem-
ployment rates are highest at the lowest wage levels. When a great hazard has been
dealt with through insurance and efforts are made to cope with the hazard directly,
such things as safety campaigns in industry and better driving programs are instituted
to reduce the hazard against insurance as carried. This force must be developed in
connection with unemployment, but in this study no attempt has been made to meas-
ure the conscious determination that unemployment shall be reduced; it is merely
hoped that such effort will be aroused soon enough to check the apparent counter
forces tending to increase unemployment. In this brief discussion, vital as the
problem is, there is no effort expended to show the range in benefits between different
years, though the distribution of good and bad years is a vital factor in the develop-
ment of funds.
It is impossible to predict the attitude of administrators yet to be chosen as to rate
adjustment after the period of good years, which we hope are immediately ahead of
us, when contributions seem to be largely in excess of benefits. Whether they can
"Sec Lotwin, Coverage of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, supra, p. 7; Huntington, The
Benefit Provisions of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, supra, p. 2o.
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resist the temptation to reduce the rates of contribution at the very time when their
continuance is relatively easy may determine the solvency of the plan. Experience
rating-the recognition of good experience-can be so handled as to wreck completely
any prior attempt to prepare for the adverse periods. One cannot estimate today the
statistical capacity of administrators in limiting the credence which they give to tiny
areas of exposure. Some of the states have already ignored the fact that experience
rating must go upwards as well as downwards.
The whole national experience is so inadequate as a guide to the general problems
of cost analysis that the fragmentary state by state variations in the depression period
should probably be looked at in their variation from the aggregate unemployment
rates, but not used very much, recognizing the factors which have entered into these
variations and in the first approximation discounting somewhat the variations and
aiming at a base rate derived from broader, considerably more dependable evidence.
In particular where certain states seem to show unemployment rates lighter than the
average, in addition to the inadequacy of census material, such limitations as the fact
of a relatively slight industrialization and the semi-absorption of excess industrial
labor into the agricultural part of the community can be recognized. When benefits
are available, however, one cannot expect the agricultural part of the community to
absorb the loss. Where high recorded rates of unemployment are noted, the advanced
industrialization of the states is in itself again somewhat responsible in that huge
enterprises have attracted the citizens of other states in the boom times and then
have massed the unemployed in large industrial communities, where their return to
their home region is less possible but where their presence rather unduly accentuates
depression conditions.
Published material which is of definite help to the individual states is practically
absent. A few references may be desirable to show sources of information, pertinent
should the state commission have a trained statistical member who can make the
necessary translation:
Report of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance in Great Britain.
Actuarial Report by Dr. I. M. Rubinow, included as Chapter XII of Part II of the
Report of The Ohio Commission on Unemployment Insurance, January 1933.
Paper by Prof. Clarence A. Kulp, "Calculation of the Cost of Unemployment Benefits
(With Particular Reference to Ohio and Pennsylvania)" with comments thereon, Proceed-
ings of the Casualty Actuarial Society, Vol. XIX, pp. 268-278; Vol. XX, pp. 17o-x87.
Actuarial Reports on the Canadian Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 by
A. D. Watson and Hugh H. Wolfenden (H. R. M. Printer, Ottawa).
"A Program for Unemployment Insurance and Relief in the United States" by Hansen,
Murray, Stevenson and Stewart (The University of Minnesota Press, x934).
The most adequate statistical studies available for the United States seem ob-
viously to be those formulated by the Committee on Economic Security following in
general the method outlined in "A Program for Unemployment Insurance and
Relief in the United States." The material developed by the Committee is not yet
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available, though a well-documented report has been prepared by the Committee and
the results are reflected in the material presented elsewhere in this volume.
Some simplification of the procedure is made in the following discussion for the
sake of condensing the report within suitable limits. The results are made to appear
too simple and the whole process of the discussion must be regarded as illustrative
and rather artificial.
For the 14 year period beginning with 1922 and now running through the year
1935, it is evident that the ratio of the unemployed to the employed in that group of
industries included in the coverage of unemployment compensation has approximated
20%. Were benefits at the rate of half-pay granted to all the unemployed, through
levying a tax against the payroll of those employed, a contribution of io% would be
essential.
Three excerpts from census returns indicate varying distributions of unemploy-
ment:
TABLE II
Illustrative Distributions of the Unemployed by Duration of Unemployment
Since the Last Employment
Los Angeles Los Angeles
Duration of Unemployment April 1930 Jan. z93z  Composite
Less than 4 weeks ........................ 42% 28% 21%
More than 4 weeks but less than 17 weeks... 40 41 36
More than 17 weeks ...................... 18 31 43
Total .............................. Ioo% Ioo% Ioo%
From this data the provision of a benefit of half-pay after a four weeks' waiting
period for a maximum of 13 weeks would seem to require payment to about 40% of
the unemployed in the first two censuses and to nearer 35% of the unemployed in the
composite census. From the composite census, given a 4% contribution rate, the
benefit period could be extended to 15 weeks after a waiting period of four weeks.
The composite table is based upon the analysis by the Committee on Economic
Security of 92 sample censuses of unemployment, including the two Los Angeles
censuses mentioned in Table II, 3 showing rates of unemployment measured against
the total potential gainful workers of less than 7%, 21 showing rates of unemploy-
ment between 7% and 11%, 43 between ii% and 20%/., 2i between 20% and 3o0,
and only 4 between 3o% and 43%. In order to develop a working table which alone
could make possible such measures of relative benefits as are subsequently discussed,
there were prepared composite percentage distributions of the unemployed from all
this census material. One composite table is given herein as Table III and indicates
the number of unemployed as a percentage of the total who have been unemployed
one week or less, and then the successive percentages at weekly intervals up to 52,
with a final single summation of those whose unemployment period is over 5: weeks.
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The cumulative summation presents an excellent working tool, but like all statistical
technique, has certain limitations. For example, given a waiting period of 2 weeks,
a maximum benefit period of io weeks, the table shows that 45.6% of the unemployed
fall under 12 weeks of unemployment, i3% under 2 weeks of unemployment. The
benefit group is shown by the difference in these two percentages, or 32.6%. This
table does not furnish a correct statement of the proportion of unemployed over any
specific period since that will depend upon which years are observed.
The various state acts so far enacted have developed personal idiosyncrasies. They
include, however, the following general provisions:2
(i) The benefit rate is half-pay, up to a maximum of generally S15 per week, and, in
some states, not less than a minimum of from $5 to $7 per week.
(2) To qualify for benefits, an unemployed person must have been employed by a
contributing employer for a minimum period ranging from 15 to 26 weeks in the preceding
year.
(3) The maximum number of weekly benefit payments is 15 or i6, but these must
not exceed a ratio of I week of benefit for 3 or 4 weeks of employment by a contributing
employer. Extra weeks of benefit payments are provided in some states on the basis of I
week of benefit for each 20 weeks of contributing employment for which no corresponding
benefit payment has been made, up to a maximum of io extra weeks.
(4) The waiting period prior to benefit payments ranges from 2 to 6 weeks.
(5) Disqualification for benefit payments is provided during the period of unemploy-
ment resulting from strikes, lock-outs, or trade disputes.
(6) Disqualification for benefit payments is provided for specified periods following
voluntary termination of employment, discharge for misconduct, or refusal to accept
suitable employment.
(7) Provision is made for possible administrative settlement of benefits by luinp sum
payments.
(8) Special provision is made in most states for benefit payments in case of partial
employment, the partial wages and benefit payments together to equal the ordinary benefit
payment or to exceed it by $ or $2.
(9) Some statutes make possible the according, through administrative action, of
special treatment to seasonal unemployment.
Illustrations of cost considerations for these numerous factors follow, assuming a
sort of hypothetical state for purposes of illustration:
I. Waiting Period: The relative importance of varying waiting periods has been
indicated in Table I and more completely by reference to Table III which shows the
exclusion of 7.2%o of the unemployed by a waiting period of I week, 3.o% by a
waiting period of 2 weeks, 17.5% by a waiting period of 3 weeks, 21.4% by a waiting
period of 4 weeks. Were unemployment compensation with a long waiting period
adopted in accordance with Mr. Sam Lewisohn's recommendation so that the funds
go to cases of extreme need and are not dissipated for short and relatively unim-
portant periods of unemployment, a waiting period of 15 weeks would exclude half
the unemployment.
'These provisions are discussed at length in Huntington, The Benefit Provisions of State Unemploy-
ment Insurance Laws, supra, p. 20.
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Another indication of the use of the waiting period in conjunction with a fixed
rate of contribution to find the effect upon the duration of benefits which can be
covered by varying the waiting period, suggests the use of Table I with an added
column showing the percentage of the unemployed corresponding to the varying
durations. With units of only one week, the results are a little crude.
TABLE IV
Percentage of Unemployment Compensable by Waiting Period and
Maximum Duration of Benefits
2.7% Contrib. 3.6% Contrib. 4.5% Contrib.
Waiting Period Duration % Duration % Duration %
2 weeks io weeks 32.6 15 weeks 44.0 2x weeks 54.8
3 II 33.0 17 45.2 24 55.4
4 12 " 33.6 18 " 44.8 26 " 54.X
Thus, a contribution of 2.7%/ on the basis of the composite unemployment table,
would provide benefits to approximately 33% of the unemployed. With a waiting
period of 2 weeks, this would indicate a duration of io weeks; against a waiting
period of 3 weeks, a duration of ii weeks. Similarly, with a contribution of 4.5%
all applicable to benefits, 55% of the unemployed could be covered, justifying a 2!
weeks' duration of benefits for a 2 weeks' waiting period, a 26 weeks' duration of
benefits for a 4 weeks' waiting period.
2. Rate of Contribution: It has already been indicated that a certain balance exists
between rate of contribution, waiting periods, and duration of benefits. For the sake
of completeness, this factor is set down. It should be noted that in Table III an in-
crease of two-thirds in the rate of contribution more than doubles the possible period
of benefits.
3. Basing Benefits on Customary Full-Time Wage Rates: The first modification
in the simple structure of rate making occurs when it is recognized that while con-
tributions are based on actual wages received, benefits do not depend upon actual
wages. They are predicated against some theoretic norm of full-time wages. Ad-
ministrative routine and practical experience may eventually make the two bases
agree, but it appears that in prosperous years 95% of the full-time may have been
worked by those eligible to benefits, while in depression years less than 90% of full-
time seems to have been worked by such employees. Thus, for the whole period
benefits would be on a basis 5% or 6%o higher than contributions. An upward cor-
rection in cost estimate will probably have to be made to the extent of 5%-.
4. Limitation of Benefits Because of Requisite Minimum Number of Weeks of
Contributions: In the hypothetic state we will assume the provision of the Alabama
act, with its 2z6 weeks of contributing employment within the previous 52 weeks, as
the norm for this limitation. No data exists to show the distribution of the unem-
ployed by preceding length of employment. Two years are to elapse before benefits
are to be paid under any of these plans. The extent of the disqualification because
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of too short a period of immediately preceding employment can only be subject to a
crude guess today. Recognizing somewhat that those last employed may be the first
laid off, it seems conservative, however, to credit no more than 5% in cost estimates
through this saving feature.
5. Discharge for Proved Misconduct, Voluntary Terminations Without Rea-
sonable Cause, and Refusal of Suitable Employment: Picking Massachusetts because
it treats all these factors alike, with 4 extra weeks of ineligibility as well as the week
determining membership in the category, there is also a reduction of maximum
benefit period. Massachusetts, with a 4 weeks' waiting period and a 16 weeks' period
of benefit would seem to provide 62.7% minus 21.4%, or 41.3%, of the unemployed
with benefits. By adding 42 more weeks to the waiting period, the proportion of
those within these categories getting benefits is apparently cut to about 27/, or by
about 350/.. The assignment of such reasons for ineligibility will vary in the ad-
ministration of the plan from the assignment of such reasons when no financial
importance attaches to the categories. If 2o/ of the unemployed were subject to a
reduction of 35%, this might reduce those eligible to benefits by as much as 7/.
The logical credit in expected costs in the hypothetical state's case may be set at 50/.
6. Labor Disputes: Save for the rather extreme penalty of a io weeks' waiting
period in New York, the customary method is to count only that time lost during
the trade dispute as time of ineligibility. The Monthly Labor Review of July 1934
seemed to indicate that in 1927 possibly 8/ of lost time was due to such causes, but
that in x932 the proportion had dropped to only .2%. Labor disputes are customarily
more serious in good times and less serious in bad times. In measuring the results in
such a period as 1922-I935, the reduction in cost because of this ineligibility probably
should not be considered as effective beyond I%.
7. Unemployment Because of Sickness or Inability to Work: The basis of unem-
ployment benefits is the ability to work and willingness to take a job. The census
data which has entered into the composite distribution of the unemployed has in-
cluded some sickness, but probably many of those out because of illness would not
have considered themselves unemployed for the purposes of a census of this type.
Most analyses of time lost because of sickness seem to show that about 2% of normal
time is lost for this reason, and yet many studies of the unemployed show as low a
percentage of unemployment due to sickness as 2/ or 3%. From the standpoint of
correcting the statistical data for its inclusion of sickness, it is probably wise not to
allow a credit of more than I% for this cause.
8. Four-to-One Ratio: The Alabama ratio of one week of benefits to four weeks
of contribution in the preceding 104 weeks, with the object of safeguarding the funds
against too exclusive a use by the habitually unemployed, is a means of guarding
against hidden seasonal unemployment. The concept that the whole program is
insurance and that benefits arise only through the loss of employment customarily
to be expected, finds expression in this use of a limiting ratio. In the good times
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where unemployment is commonly available, the reasonably prompt termination of
benefit is sometimes considered desirable in giving added stimulus to the unemployed
in their search for available work. This limitation is similar to the limitation,
number 4, above. An investigation of the guarded reports of British experience
suggest a possible credit to cost of io%.
9. Seasonal Unemployment: None of the states has yet dealt to any considerable
extent with this problem. The Canadian program has eliminated large numbers of
categories where clear seasonality occurs and where, in a common unemployment
insurance program, altogether too large a proportion of the benefits would go to
people who had never built up that expectation of continuous employment. On the
whole the administrative attitude toward dealing with seasonal unemployment may
be a major element of cost. It was understood by the staff working on the national
data that much seasonality is hidden to some extent because of the combination of
data where seasonal slack seasons seem to counterbalance each other in different
parts of the country. This hidden unemployment can be quite serious. It affects
both coverage and possible benefits. The actual numerical coverage may be larger
than that indicated by the average employment figures, while the extent of part.time
employment may thereby be understated. Important as this factor is, evaluation of
it is left to the special contingency recognition later discussed.
Io. Part-Time Unemployment: The New York law establishing the unemploy-
ment compensation administration, calls upon them to make a repoit early in X937
carrying recommendations for the treatment of part-time workers. This, again, is a
major factor in cost. Should employers commonly adopt a share-the-work program
with work in each day, contributions may be paid upon a lower than so-called
"normal" rate of earnings, no benefits being paid during the period of part-time
work. When benefits do become payable through complete termination of employ-
ment, it will be at a considerably higher level than the basis of contributions. On the
other hand, if the employer worked each individual full-time when he works, but
laid off successive portions of the staff, contributions would be based upon full-time
rates but much more unemployed time would be compensated. The general sug-
gestion that where an employee works less than half a week he shall draw in unem-
ployment benefits enough to furnish him $2.00 more than the benefits he would get
through full-time unemployment, after crediting one-half week per week towards
the waiting period, may function as a credit against unemployment benefits or may
work as an additional charge. Until special reports are prepared on this subject, it
might be advisable to estimate this part-time benefit as increasing the cost by 4%,
with the understanding that when there is conscious selection against the fund by
an employer, some recognition has been allotted in determining the special con-
tingency provision.
ii. Commutation of Benefits: Whenever the privilege of commuting benefits
into a lump sum is offered under a state program, this will result in either a slight
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gain or a slight loss to the fund. Due to the inability to value completely the prob-
ability of remaining unemployed and subject to benefits, most such flexible options
tend to work against the financial interests of a fund. In the hypothetical state it
may be desirable to recognize the weight of this factor as increasing the financial
strain by I%.
12. Extra Weeks Unemployment Benefit for Long Service Without Prior Ben-
efits: The New Hampshire Act, aiming to give a maximum grant to the most
worthy individuals, provides that long periods of contribution without accepting
benefits shall build up rights to added benefits when unexpected unemployment
occurs; one week for 22 weeks when the employee has contributed I% within the
preceding six years, up to a maximum of io weeks. The shifting employee, who
gets a new job so promptly that he never qualifies for benefits, and the man with an
uninterrupted service with a single employer, will both build up rights to added
benefits. The experience in Great Britain seemed to indicate that at least 6o% of
the employees were subject to no unemployment creating benefit rights within a
year, and that over a period of several years probably 40% of all employees secured no
benefits whatever. In times of depression, lay-offs subject to benefits occur not only
among the customary claimants but also among this group who had come to regard
their service as permanent or who had felt no doubt as to their ability, when leaving
one job, to secure another. In depression times it is conceivable that the unemployed
would qualify for these added benefits, as follows:
TABLE V
20o% eligible to no extra weeks
20% "9 9 2 (
20% " " "
20% . 7 .. .
20% " cc " 
This might result in eligibility to as much as 5 weeks' extra benefits in the de-
pression period for the entire body of unemployed. The benefit in the early years of
operation when statistics are being built up, will probably be negligible-another case
of the lag in costs making itself felt. The probable extent of extra benefits may be
so large that in the hypothetical states its recognition adds iovo to costs.
13. Correction for Disparity Between Data Derived from Censuses and the
Benefit Provisions of the Plan: Census figures which have entered into the prepara-
tion of Table III have inquired only into the duration of the past period of unemploy-
ment. Benefits under the unemployment compensation plans depend upon the
accumulation of successive periods of unemployment. There is also the element of
omission from censuses of a considerable number of individuals with short periods
of unemployment who are practically certain to return to work and who would not
report themselves as unemployed in this type of census but whose unemployment
would count toward the waiting period preceding benefits. Thus the figures of
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unemployment for short periods are undoubtedly understated and the proportion of
unemployed at the lower periods would tend to be increased. On the other hand, if
the type of census were translated into one which gave, during the past year, the
amount of unemployment in cumulative periods, the whole tendency of such a cor-
rection in census would be to raise the proportion unemployed for the longer period.
This calls for a complete recasting of the entire framework, which is completely
impossible. A guess is hazarded that the result of such recasting might reduce those
eligible to benefits by 5% and be a credit in cost of this amount.
14. Increased Unemployment Following the Use of the Plan and a General Con-
tingency Provision for Inadequate Statistics and Temporary Abuse of the Plan:
There is in almost all insurance a lag in the recording of complete benefits. There
are frequently elements of selection which result in a steadily increasing rate of
benefit over many years, forces which could be recognized at the inception of a
program were the statistical information more extensive. There seems also to be a
point of sudden speeding-up in acquiring an understanding of how to make valid
claims, at the same time that ability to "get away with" incorrect claims develops, so
that the normal increased use of the coverage is intertwined with an actual abuse
thereof. Possibly this is best illustrated in recent insurance history by the permanent-
total-disability provision issued in connection with life insurance. For many years,
particularly the years following recent medical selection of the insured lives, the
claim rates were relatively light. Then education among the insured lives as to the
methods of securing benefits seemed to develop claims very rapidly, while the early
depression years seemed to create also a moral hazard which made exorbitant de-
mands for benefits beyond those which had been intended in this form of insurance.
In unemployment compensation we have a rather close parallel, since in both it is
the termination of the income against which the protection is carried.
In unemployment insurance a few illustrative factors of such education are here
set down:
(a) Many a conscientious employer has carried on payroll individual excess
workers whom he really did not need because, in the absence of any benefit pro-
gram, he hesitated to throw them on relief. When men so carried cannot be
effectively used, when their continuance on payroll creates a waste from the stand-
point of production cost, the availability of unemployment benefits would logically,
and without creating a sense of fraudulent use of the plan, eliminate unnecessary
workmen more promptly.
(b) Administration of health insurance has shown that there is a group requiring
very close observation to prevent malingering. In developing competent administra-
tion, a certain amount of this abuse seems inherent in unemployment insurance.
(c) Married Women: In Great Britain an increasing number of married women
entered the labor market after the introduction of unemployment insurance, increas-
ing the coverage eligible to benefits without increasing the available employment.
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Anything which forces a keener recognition of the limitation of income, as do the
tax rates upon the employee and the employer in social insurance, will tend to force
a considerable additional number of other members of a family into the market to
increase family income through adding another wage earner. A special attempt to
reduce this hazard to its income has developed in the administration of the British
unemployment insurance.
(d) Increased Efficiency: The process of industrial technique functions all the
time to increase per capita output and to eliminate wastes. When the employer's
attention has been directed to the added necessity of efficiency through new forms of
taxation, this process will probably be speeded up. The men eliminated will also
generally be the less efficient workmen and the men who, with commonly rising
employment standards, are most unable to find other work. The measurement of
the extent of the increase in this existing factor is now beyond the scope of the
statistician.
(e) While working rules are now postponed as to seasonal and part-time benefits
and state administrators are doubtful as to the exact basis for early tentative rulings
thereon, liberality of treatment may result in granting additional benefits in payments
beyond those expected by the framers of the law.
(f) Effective Number of Hours in Working Week: The 30 week maximum
advocated in many of the labor demands is believed by them to be a force to reduce
unemployment. The delay in official recognition of any change may continue a
nominally longer work-week against which much total and partial unemployment
benefits may be paid. The method of making changes in the length of working
week may have a vital influence upon the cost of unemployment insurance.
(g) Inadequacy of Basic Data: We have known so little about the actual facts
of employment and unemployment that the construction of tabular data for the
determination of probable costs of unemployment insurance may seriously understate
the necessary provision, or it could conceivably overstate the necessary provision.
Scarcity of data as to the actual number of potentially gainfully employed is com-
plicated by the steady influx of the unemployed in recent years just above school age.
Their absorption into the labor market may progress at the expense of older workers,
particularly when the older workers are somewhat substandard. The arbitrary char-
acter of the composite census table must be understood, and it must be understood
that radically different corrections will develop from the use of data of, let us say,
1927-1935, than will follow from the use of data of the period 1922-1929. There is so
large an element of error in the entire data utilized that a reasonable contingency
allowance must be established in recognition of this factor.
(a) to (g) Inclusive: Summarizing all of these factors, with no claim that the
correct valuation of possible use or abuse of the program, the inadequacy of basic
material, or a recognition of catastrophic changes is accorded thereby, a crude increase
in costs for all of these factors is recommended at approximately one-third, or 33%-
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When all of these factors leading to adjustment have been summarized, we seem
to have a modification of the costs which would develop from the first two numbered
factors, by using factors numbered 3-14, calling for an increase in probable cost of
26%, or roughly, 25/. Assuming that the hypothetical state had determined upon a
waiting period of 3 weeks with a maximum benefit payment of 15 weeks, but with
io extra possible weeks of benefit for long periods of employment without claim
making, Table III indicates that 41.5% of the unemployed would be eligible for
benefits. This would correspond to a contribution rate of 4.15% to the state fund.
Increasing this by 25/ suggests a contribution rate of 5.2%, against the rate of 2.7%
actually provided in several of the state laws, or, assuming the additional employee
contribution of 1.35% provided in some acts, a total contribution rate of 4.05%.
The use of preliminary term insurance is very common in life insurance sales.
Young men with prospects for certain advancement but with current low incomes,
buy five year term policies which they later change to adequate level premium life
or life and annuity protection. In the light of the hope that unemployment is about
to be reduced and recovery to proceed, it is expected that new unemployment would be
lighter in the next few years than in the period observed in the studies outlined. All
the evidence indicates that in such relatively good years the 4.o/ rate, even the 2.7%
rate, ought to be adequate. The postponement of any benefit payment for two com-
plete years after contributions begin will, in a state with a 1936 contribution rate of
i% and a 1937 contribution rate of 2P, build up advance provision of about 3/ of
one year's wages, or the approximate equivalent of one year's contribution when the
full rate of 3% has become effective. Provided, therefore, the administrators under-
stood that the initial rate schedule may not be an adequate long-time rate schedule,
there seems no immediate cause for alarm in the adoption of the contribution rates
which have been so far provided. The unknown contingencies and the rate correc-
tion might be a credit instead of a debit. Moreover, there is the further reason for
optimism that the force which has not been measured, directed conscientiously,
co~peratively and intelligently to the reduction of unemployment, might conceivably
become so important as to forestall the need of any higher rates. It is recommended,
however, that each state seriously recognize the considerations leading to the possible
deficiency in the rates so far enunciated by other states, when surveying the statistical
problems that face them.
The best approach open to any state commission is to request the fullest co~pera-
tion on the part of the Social Security Board, so as to gain access to as much of the
limited data as may be available.
